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Payments to Unsecured Creditors Under Chapter 13
of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
Chapter 13' of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19782 has revitalized a
form of bankruptcy under which debtors repay their creditors over time
with the approval and protection of the bankruptcy court. The main source
of payment to creditors under chapter 13 is the debtor's future income.4
In contrast, a "straight" bankruptcy under chapter 7 of the Act requires
a liquidation of the debtor's nonexempt assets and a distribution of the
proceeds to creditors.5 The debtor who chooses chapter 13 proposes a
plan of payments which the court either confirms or rejects.' If the plan
is confirmed, the debtor can carry out the proposed payments free from
harassment by creditors.7 Soon after performance of a confirmed plan is
completed, the debtor receives a discharge of indebtedness
A great controversy has developed among both courts9 and commenta-
tors" regarding the amount of payments that must be proposed to unsecured
creditors for confirmation of a chapter 13 plan. The only requirement
1 11 U.S.C. §5 1301-1330 (Supp. IV 1980). For a thorough discussion of the background
of chapter 13, see In re Scher, [1981] 7 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CCR) 979; In re Hurd, 4 Bankr.
551 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1980).2 11 U.S.C. §5 101-151326 (Supp. IV 1980).
1 Participation in the new chapter 13 has more than doubled compared to the number
of individuals who filed repayment plans during the last full year of its predecessor, chapter
XI of the Chandler Act, 11 U.S.C. SS 1001-1086 (1976) (current version at 11 U.S.C. SS
1301-1330 (Supp. IV 1980)). Cyr, The Chapter 18 "Good Faith" Tempest: An Analysis and
Proposal for Change, 55 AM. BANKE. L.J. 271, 272 n.6 (1981).
1 5 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 1322.0111[2] (15th ed. 1981).
5 11 U.S.C. SS 701-728 (Supp. IV 1980). Assets that are exempt from creditors' claims
are set out in id. S 522.
- Id. SS 1321-1326.
7 Id. SS 362(c), 1327.
1 Id. S 1328(a).
'See notes 13-17 & accompanying text infra.
Compare Note, Good Faith, Zero Plans, and the Purposes of Bankruptcy Code Chapter
18: A Legislative Solution to the Controversy, 61 B.U.L. REV. 773 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as Note, Legislative Solution] (zero payment plans should be rejected in order to effectuate
spirit and purpose of statute), and Note, Bankruptcy: Good Faith and the Zero Payment
Plan in Chapter 18, 69 Ky. L.J. 326 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, Zero Payment Plan]
(zero or nominal payment plans violate "good faith" requirement and should not be con-
firmed), and Note, Abusing Chapter 18 of the Bankruptcy Code: The Problem of Nonrepay-
nent, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 941 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Abusing Chapter 18] ("abusive"
plans should be rejected on basis of history and purpose of the statute), with Note, Chapter
18 De Minimis Plans: Toward a Consensus on "Good Faith," 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 593 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Note, De Minimis Plans] (nominal payment plans can be confirmed
if debtor has dealt fairly with his creditors), and Note, "Good Faith" and Confirmation
of Chapter 18 Composition Plans: Analysis and a Proposal, 65 MIm. L. REV. 659 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Composition Plans] (zero payment plans can be confirmed if they
represent the debtor's "bst effort").
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that deals specifically with the plan's treatment of general unsecured
creditors is found in section 1325(a)(4) of chapter 13: the value of proper-
ty to be distributed to each creditor must be "not less than" what would
be paid to that creditor under chapter 7.1' The Act's legislative history,
however, indicates that Congress expected creditors to be paid more if
a debtor chooses to proceed under chapter 13 instead of chapter 7." Some
courts rely extensively on the legislative history in determining payment
requirements; 3 others focus on the language of section 1325(a)(4).4
The benefits of chapter 13 that are not available under chapter 7 have
added' to the confusion surrounding the issue of payments to unsecured
creditors. Many courts have found that the requirement of section
1325(a)(3) that the plan be "proposed in good faith"'" is not satisfied if
the debtor takes advantage of the more complete relief of chapter 13
without proposing "substantial" payments to general unsecured creditors. 6
Other courts have confirmed chapter 13 plans that propose no payments
at all to unsecured creditors. 7
This note proposes an approach that occupies a middle ground in the
controversy over chapter 13 payments. The note suggests that the benefits
of chapter 13 do not compel a burden of particularly high payments, but
statutory language that has generally been ignored in this context is in-
terpreted to impose a requirement of some payment to general unsecured
creditors. The note concludes that "good faith" imposes a requirement
of a reasonable effort to pay creditors.
SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 13 AND ITS SPECIAL BENEFITS
The central element of a chapter 13 proceeding is the repayment plan
filed by the debtor. 8 The plan may propose payments to creditors over
11 11 U.S.C. S 1325(a)(4) (Supp. IV 1980).
12 The House Report states: "[T]he bill requires only that creditors receive under the
plan more than they would if the debtor went into straight bankruptcy." H.R. REP. No.
595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 123-24 (1977), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5963, 6084-85. The Senate Report states: "It is also necessary to prevent chapter 13 plans
from turning into mere offers of composition plans under which payments would equal
only the non-exempt assets of the debtor." S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1978),
reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5799.
1 E.g., In re Bldom, 3 Bankr. 467 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1980); In re Iacovoni, 2 Bankr. 256
(Bankr. D. Utah 1980).
11 E.g., In re Harper, 11 Bankr. 395 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981); In re Cloutier, 3 Bankr. 584
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1980).
,' 11 U.S.C. S 1325(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1980).
E.g., In re Marsch, 11 Bankr. 514 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1981) (25% payment plan rejected);
In re Howard, 3 Bankr. 75 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980) (8% payment plan rejected); In re Bur-
rell, 2 Bankr. 650 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1980) (15% payment plan rejected); rev'd & remanded,
6 Bankr. 360 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
17 E.g., In re Carter, 9 Bankr. 140 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981); In re Thebeau, 3 Bankr. 537
(Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1980).
11 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1330 (Supp. IV 1980).
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a maximum period of three years; with court approval, the plan may ex-
tend up to five years. 9 The debtor decides on the amount of payments
to be proposed after subtracting living expenses from anticipated income.'
The plan must provide full payment of priority unsecured claims, which
include administrative expenses, employee salaries, and taxes.' The court
must confirm the plan if six criteria set out in section 1325(a) are fulfilled.,
The most obvious advantage of chapter 13 is that it allows a debtor
to keep his property, including assets that would be nonexempt and
therefore subject to creditors' claims under chapter 7.1 Moreover, while
chapter 7 debtors generally must surrender property that secures a claim,'
the chapter 13 debtor may elect to keep the collateral and "cram down"
the secured creditor.5 "Cram down" involves giving the secured creditor
property that is worth "not less than" the value of the collateral.2' If the
collateral is worth less than the outstanding indebtedness, the payments
19 Id. S 1322(c).
20 BANKR. R.P. Form 13-5.
21 11 U.S.C. S 1322(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
2 (a) The court shall confirm a plan if-
(1) the plan complies with the provisions of this title;
(2) any fee, charge, or amount required under chapter 123 of title 28,
or by the plan, to be paid before confirmation, has been paid;
(3) the plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means for-
bidden by law;
(4) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be
distributed under the plan on account of each allowed unsecured claim is
not less than the amount that would be paid on such claim if the estate
of the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on such date;
(5) with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the plan-
(A) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan;
(B)(i) the plan provides that the holder of such claim retain the lien
securing such claim; and
(ii) the value as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be
distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not less than the
allowed amount of such claim; or
(C) the debtor surrenders the property securing such claim to such
holder; and
(6) the debtor will be able to make all payments under the plan and to
comply with the plan.
Id. S 1325(a).
Id. SS 1306(b), 1327(b).
24An exception arises if the property securing a claim is exempt under S 522, and it
is tangible personal property intended for personal, family, or household use. In such cases
the debtor may redeem the property at the time of the liquidation by paying the creditor
the amount of the allowed secured claim. Id. S 722. A claim is secured only to the extent
of the value of the collateral. Id. S 506.
Id. 5 1325(a)(5)(B). See also 5 W. COLLIER, supra note 4, 1325.0112][EI[2][b], at 1325-21
to 1325-27; Note, Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: Chapter 13 Cramdoum of the Secured Creditor,
1981 WIs. L. REv. 333.
" Future payments on secured claims are valued "as of the effective date of the plan,"
to ensure that the creditor receives the equivalent of an immediate surrender of the col-
lateral. 11 U.S.C. S 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (Supp. IV 1980); W. COLLIER, supra note 4,
1325.0112][E][2][b], at 1325-23 to 1325-24.
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needed to cram down the creditor may be much lower than the payments
required by the loan agreement.'
If the chapter 13 debtor completes all payments proposed by the con-
firmed plan, he is allowed a very broad discharge of debts. 8 This "super
discharge" includes debts that may not be discharged under chapter 7,
such as student loans, debts for obtaining money by false pretenses or
embezzlement, and debts incurred for willful and malicious injury by the
debtor." The only debts that may not be discharged under chapter 13
are for alimony or child support" and debts on which the last payment
is due after the plan is to be completed." If the debtor fails to complete
all payments as proposed, he is eligible for a hardship discharge if three
conditions are met." The hardship discharge is only equal to the chapter
7 discharge."
The Bankruptcy Reform Act, like its predecessor,' limits the frequency
with which a debtor may take advantage of chapter 7 relief. A discharge
will not be granted in a chapter 7 case commenced within six years after
the filing of a petition in another liquidation which resulted in a discharge.5
The Act also restricts access to a chapter 7 discharge when prior relief
under chapter 13 has been granted. 8 The Act places no limits, however,
on how often a debtor may receive a chapter 13 discharge.
Unlike prior law, 7 approval by a majority of the unsecured creditors
is not required for confirmation of a chapter 13 plan. Section 1325(a)(4),
known as the "best interests of creditors" test, requires only that distribu-
tions to unsecured creditors be "not less than" what would be paid in
a liquidation under chapter 7.' In most bankruptcies all the debtor's assets
See, e.g., In re Campbell, 3 Bankr. 57 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980).
11 U.S.C. S 1328(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
' Id. S 523(a). The super discharge is in great danger of being repealed. Both houses
of Congress have passed versions of a bill that would abolish the broader discharge in
whole or in part. S. 658, 96th Cong. 2d Sess., S 130, 126 CONG. REC. S15170, S15176 (daily
ed. Dec. 1, 1980); S. 658, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., § 129, 126 CONG. REc. H11735, H11740 (daily
ed. Dec. 3, 1980). See also Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1981, S. 863, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. S 130, 127 CONG. REC. S7904 (daily ed. July 17, 1981).
11 U.S.C. S 1328(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
"i Id- S 1328(a)(1).
The hardship discharge is allowed if, first, the failure to complete payments is due
to circumstances for which the debtor should not be held accountable; second, if modifica-
tion of the plan under S 1329 is not practicable; and third, if the value of property actually
distributed to unsecured creditors is not less than what would have been paid under a
liquidation. Id. S 1328(b).
' Id. S 1328(c).
' 11 U.S.C. S 32(c)(5) (1976) (current version at 11 U.S.C. S 727(a)(8)-(9) (Supp. IV 1980)).
' 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8) (Supp. IV 1980).
' In order to receive another discharge in a chapter 7 case commenced within the six
year limitation period after a chapter 13 case, the debtor must have paid 100% of unsecured
claims in the chapter 13 case or paid at least 70% of the unsecured claims and proposed
in good faith a plan that was the debtor's best effort. Id. S 727(a)(9).
11 U.S.C. § 1052 (1976) (repealed 1978).
11 U.S.C. S 1325(a)(4) (Supp. IV 1980).
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are exempt, providing no source of payment to unsecured creditors in
a liquidation.9 In such cases the best interests test is satisfied by a chapter
13 plan that proposes no payments to general unsecured creditors. This
note will refer to such plans as "zero payment plans."
CHAPTER 13 BENEFITS AND THEIR EFFECT ON
PAYMENT REQUIREMENTS
Good Faith and the Benefits
A recurrent theme in many of the reported cases is the concern that
a debtor should not be allowed the special benefits of chapter 13 unless
he proposes to make "substantial" payments to unsecured creditors. 0
Several attempts have been made to develop a legitimate statutory
justification for rejecting zero payment plans; these efforts have been
unconvincing, however."1
" REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc.
No. 137 (pt. 1), 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 104-05, 123, 135-36, 150, 162 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT].
See, e.g., In re Hall, 4 Bankr. 341, 342 (Bankr. EDl. Va. 1980) (court acknowledged that
most courts "have reached the conclusion based on the legislative history, the generous
discharge provisions and the purpose and spirit of a chapter 13 proceeding, that substan-
tial and meaningful payment to unsecured creditors is required for a chapter 13 plan to
be confirmed as being proposed in good faith"); see cases cited note 16 supra.
41 At least one court found statutory authority to reject zero payment plans under S
1307(c), which allows a court to dismiss a case or convert it to chapter 7 "for cause." In
re Seman, 4 Bankr. 568 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980). The court found that the incompatibility
of zero payment plans with the statutory scheme was sufficient cause for rejecting them.
Id. at 572. Section 1307(c) does not authorize rejecting a plan, however, and therefore does
not create any statutory basis for rejection beyond the requirements of S 1325(a). Although
S 1307(c) lists "denial of confirmation of a plan under section 1325" as sufficient cause for
dismissing or converting a case, 11 U.S.C. S 1307(c)(4) (Supp. IV 1980) (emphasis added),
the Seman court did not rely on S 1325.
The "best interests of creditors" test in S 1325(a)(4) has been used to reject plans that
take advantage of the super discharge. In re Chaffin, 4 Bankr. 324 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980).
The creditor whose debt is subject to the super discharge would retain the right to pursue
the debtor after a chapter 7 discharge. The argument is that the creditor must be paid
in full under chapter 13 in order to receive not less than what he would receive in a li-
quidation. The major flaw in this argument is that the right to collect the debt that is
retained under chapter 7T is not property that is distributed from the debtor's estate, and
is therefore irrelevant to the "best interests" test. See In re Marlow, 3 Bankr. 305, 308
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1980). The suggested interpretation would in effect render the debt non-
dischargeable, a result which is contrary to the language of S 1328(a). 3ee notes 28-29 &
accompanying text supra. The interpretation would also require separate classification for
the debt that is included in the super discharge, which may not be allowed. See notes 63-64
& accompanying text infra.
At least one court has argued that the "best interests" test requires that unsecured
creditors receive "more than" what would be paid under chapter 7. In re Iacovoni, 2 Bankr.
256, 266 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980). The court suggested that the words "not less than" were
chosen for the benefit of debtors whose assets would yield full payment to creditors in
a liquidation. Id. These debtors obviously should not be required to pay more than 100%
1982]
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The majority of courts that reject zero payment plans rely on the good
faith requirement of section 1325(a)(3).42 The courts bolster their decisions
with the legislative history expressing Congress' expectations that
creditors would be paid more when a debtor chooses chapter 13 instead
of liquidation.4" Commentators have observed, however, that the statute
and legislative history offer no definition of "good faith," much less any
indication that good faith was to be evaluated in light of the special
benefits of chapter 13." Some courts have acknowledged that the generally
understood meaning of "good faith" cannot justify a requirement of
substantial payments;4" they have simply invented a new meaning to ac-
commodate their interpretation of congressional intent.
Congressional Intent and the Benefits of Chapter 13
The courts that impose payment requirements based on the benefits
of chapter 13 have ignored the most obvious explanation for Congress'
intent in providing the benefits. The expectations of greater payments
to creditors found in the legislative history were not based on the benefits
provided in chapter 13, but on the premise that debtors want to pay their
creditors, and that many debtors will propose full payment if given the
of their indebtedness; in all other cases, the court argues, "more than" was intended. The
phrase "not less than" is clear on its face, however; there is no room for such interpreta-
tion when applying S 1325(a)(4). See In re Cloutier, 3 Bankr. 584, 585 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980).
For a discussion of a rationale based on S 1325(a)(3), see notes 42-45 & accompanying
text infra.
"2 See, e.g., In re Terry, 630 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1980); In re Cook, 3 Bankr. 480 (Bankr.
S.D. W. Va. 1980).
See note 12 supra.
"See Note, Composition Plans, supra note 10, at 667-71; Note, De Minimis Plans, supra
note 10, at 621 n.191. Many courts argue that good faith is lacking when a debtor proposes
to take advantage of the more liberal chapter 13 relief with a plan that is quantitatively
equivalent to a liquidation. These courts characterize nominal payment plans as attempts
to deceive the court into granting relief that the debtor is not entitled to. See, e.g., In
re Chaffin, 4 Bankr. 324 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980); In re Bloom, 3 Bankr. 467 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1980); In re Campbell, 3 Bankr. 57 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980). However, a debtor who has disclosed
a lack of ability to pay unsecured creditors is hardly guilty of deceit or bad faith. The
debtor's legitimate intent is to receive the best possible relief, a motive that is shared
by all debtors. One court that rejects any inference of improper motive or intent states
that "[t]here is a latent assumption in many of the opinions which I have examined that
the desire of debtors to go through bankruptcy proceedings on the most favorable terms
permissible under the Code is in itself an act of bad faith ... " In re Koerperich, 5 Bankr.
752, 755 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1980). It is illogical to find that a debtor who intends to pay creditors
all that he can reasonably afford is lacking good faith because of the amount he proposes
to pay.
" E.g., In re Iacovoni, 2 Bankr. 256, 268 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980) ("The Court's interpreta-
tion of 'good faith' as used in Chapter 13 follows no traditional bankruptcy meaning of
the phrase; neither -is this interpretation meant to apply nor can it logically extend, to
any similar phrase elsewhere in the law.").
[Vol. 57:189
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right opportunity." Congress showed little concern for establishing par-
ticularly high payment percentages that would be required of all deb-
tors; of great concern to the drafters, however, was encouraging more
debtors to choose repayment plans over liquidation.7 The expansion of
chapter 13 eligibility to include more debtors, 8 and the provisions for
more complete relief, must have been designed to increase participation
in chapter 13.
The need for incentives to attract debtors becomes evident when the
prospect of paying off debts for up to three years under chapter 13 is
compared with straight bankruptcy. Chapter 7 provides a quick discharge
of debts and requires no continuing effort or sacrifice. Moreover, the
stigma associated with straight bankruptcy may be diminishing. 9 Signifi-
cant advantages to outweigh the burdens of debt repayment are therefore
an integral part of chapter 13. The goal of attracting debtors is substan-
tially undermined when the advantages are linked to payment require-
ments.5
" "We found that most of these people truly want to repay their debts. But the pro-
cedure for repayment for individual debtors, chapter XII [sic], isn't working well. Its scope
is too limited-the requirements for eligibility are too narrow." 123 CONG. REC. 35,446 (1977)
(remarks of Rep. Edwards). "First, and most important, we make it easier for debtors to
repay their debts under the supervision and protection of the bankruptcy laws." Id.
The House Report states: "The hearings before the Subcommittee indicated strongly
that most consumer debtors would rather work out a repayment plan than file straight
bankruptcy. They opt for straight bankruptcy only because present chapter XIII simply
cannot meet their needs." H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 12, at 117.
" "The premises of the bill with respect to consumer bankruptcy are that use of the
bankruptcy law should be a last resort; [and] that if it is used, debtors should attempt
repayment under chapter 13, Adjustment of Debts of an Individual with Regular Income
... ." H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 12, at 118. "In the consumer area, proposed chapter
13 encourages more debtors to repay their debts over an extended period rather than
to opt for straight bankruptcy liquidation and discharge." Id. at 5.
See note 52 & accompanying text infra.
"A Rush to Personal Bankruptcy, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 11, 1980, at 59. It also is not clear
that chapter 13 debtors who make less than full payment will not suffer some stigma or
damage to their credit rating, see 5 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY, 1300.01, at 1300-18 n.31 (15th
ed. 1979), even though Congress clearly expected that these problems would not be ex-
perienced under chapter 13, H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 12, at 118.
1 Two cases illustrate the unfair and improper decisions that can result from a preoc-
cupation with the benefits of chapter 13. In In re Ponanski, 11 Bankr. 661 (Bankr. D.R.I.
1981) the court considered the plan of a debtor who took home $919.34 a month and offered
to pay creditors $219.34 a month for 36 months. Although the debtor's plan appeared to
be a strong effort, the court incorrectly rejected it because more than half of his total
debt consisted of student loans which would have been nondischargeable under chapter
7. Id. at 662.
The court in In re Howard, 3 Bankr. 75 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980), rejected a plan that
proposed to pay only one percent of unsecured indebtedness in five monthly payments.
The debtors then proposed a stronger plan which would yield an eight percent dividend
to unsecured creditors and which was based in part on cuts in the original plan's budget.
Id. at 76. The court rejected the new plan for lack of good faith, calling it "a disguised
Chapter 7 Liquidation." Id. What was particularly unfair was the court's alternative find-
ing that because the debtors would be unable to make the payments, the plan could be
1982]
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The most logical view of congressional intent is that the drafters decided
that the likelihood of large payments in many, but not all, cases was suf-
ficient to justify the special benefits of chapter 13. This interpretation
is supported by the measures enacted to reform the old chapter XIII.
First, Congress eliminated the requirement of creditor approval, yet did
not add a requirement of substantial payments."1 Further, in expanding
chapter 13 eligibility standards to include even debtors who receive public
assistance,-' Congress could not have expected large payments in all cases.
Finally, the old chapter XIII was criticized for its tendency to result in
full payment plans that debtors could not afford.' The new law was design-
ed to be more flexible in accommodating the debtor's individual circum-
stances," which is not compatible with a uniform requirement of large
payments.
Congress may have been overoptimistic in gauging the willingness and
ability of debtors to pay unsecured creditors under a chapter 13 plan.
In view of the clear intent to increase participation and to provide flex-
ible standards for evaluating payment plans, however, some courts have
gone too far in converting Congress' vague predictions of debtor behavior
into requirements for all cases.5
Specific Benefits of Chapter 13 and Their Possible
Effect on Payment Requirements
At least one court, in In re Cook," has used good faith to develop a
sliding scale of payment requirements, under which "the adequacy of the
plan depends upon the extent to Which the debtor is invoking the special
relief afforded by the Chapter. '57 While this analysis is burdened with
rejected under S 1325(a)(6). Id. Howard placed the debtors in a Catch-22 situation: the court
found that the proposed payments were insufficient; however, when the debtors adjusted
their budget to provide for greater payments, the court said the plan was unfeasible.
5' But see In re Burrell, 6 Bankr. 360, 364 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (requirement of substantial
payments to unsecured creditors carries over from prior law, since it was not unambiguously
abolished by present statute).
I "Even individuals whose primary income is from investments, pensions, social securi-
ty, or welfare may use chapter 13 if their income is sufficiently stable and regular. This
expansion of eligibility will enable many to work out arrangements with their creditors
rather than seeking straight bankruptcy liquidation." H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 12, at
119. "The new chapter 13 will permit almost any individual with regular income to propose
and have approved a reasonable plan for debt repayment based on that individual's exact
circumstances." S. REP. No. 989, supra note 12, at 13.
" "Under present law, the consent requirement often prevents a debtor from making
a legitimate offer of less than full payment, for fear that the offer will not obtain the re-
quisite consents. Instead, the debtor, unable to pay his debts in full within a reasonable
period, will opt for liquidation." H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 12, at 123.
u See note 52 supra.
See notes 16 & 50 supra.
3 Bankr. 480 (Bankr. S.D. W. Va. 1980).
Id. at 486.
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the same flaws common to other broad interpretations of "good faith,"
it is the most logical and fairest way to link payment requirements to
the special benefits of chapter 13. The sliding scale approach will be ac-
cepted for purposes of argument in order to demonstrate that the advan-
tages of chapter 13 do not compel a particular amount of distributions
to general unsecured creditors.
Two advantages of chapter 13 should not result in a compensating re-
quirement of large payments. The cram down option and the ability to
keep even nonexempt property are both offset by burdens on the debtor
who uses them. When a debtor keeps collateral securing a claim, he must
part with income or other assets with a present value equal to that of
the collateral. 59 Similarly, when a debtor chooses to keep nonexempt prop-
erty, the best interests test requires that unsecured creditors receive
payments that are at least equal to the distributions that would result
from a liquidation of the property.' The payment requirements built into
these provisions should satisfy courts that believe that a debtor must
earn the advantages of chapter 13.
The super discharge and the unlimited frequency of discharge allowed
under chapter 13 are more dramatic advantages because they allow
discharge of claims that are nondischargeable in a liquidation. When the
super discharge is used, however, it is illogical to raise payment re-
quirements on all unsecured claims merely because one particular debt
is included in a plan.61 If, as advocated in Cook, the adequacy of a debtor's
proposed payments depends on the relief to be obtained under chapter
13, any higher payment should be imposed only on debts that are non-
dischargeable under chapter 7. Such logical consistency to the analysis
of Cook creates serious difficulties, however. First, requiring large
payments that may be beyond the debtor's ability tends to undermine
the statutory provisions allowing the debt to be dischargeable . 2 An even
thornier problem is that in order to pay more on a particular unsecured
See notes 44-47 & accompanying text supra.
" 11 U.S.C. S 1325(a)(5)(B) (Supp. IV 1980). See notes 24-27 & accompanying text supra.
11 U.S.C. S 1325(a)(4) (Supp. IV 1980).
See In re Marlow, 3 Bankr. 305, 308 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1980).
Some courts may feel a need to restrict use of the super discharge because of the
kinds of debts involved. Certainly it would be a legitimate legislative decision to prohibit
discharge of some debts, particularly those incurred through intentional misconduct. See
note 29 & accompanying text supra. As long as the super discharge is allowed, however,
courts should not be concerned .with the nature of the debts to be discharged.
One commentator proposes a legislative change requiring that debts that are non-
dischargeable under chapter 7 be satisfied before any payments can be applied toward
other unsecured debts. Note, Abusing Chapter 13, supra note 10, at 967-68. This measure
may be appropriate in view of Congress' apparent reluctance to retain the super discharge,
see note 29 supra; however, to the extent that nonfavored creditors receive nothing the
goal of reducing creditors' losses, see note 112 infra, is not realized.
1982]
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debt the debtor must classify it separately in his plan;' a classification
based on nondischargeability under chapter 7 may not be permissible."
The structure of chapter 13 nevertheless supports a requirement of
some payments to unsecured creditors when the super discharge is used.
The chapter 13 debtor who proposes payments to general unsecured
creditors but fails to complete the plan might receive only the narrower
hardship discharge.5 If a plan proposing no payments on unsecured claims
is confirmed, however, the debtor is likely to receive the full discharge
even if he fails to complete payments on secured claims." The debtor
who tries to pay unsecured creditors and then fails may be penalized if
his plan includes debts that are nondischargeable under chapter 7.1
Although some payments should be proposed on unsecured claims to avoid
this unfair result, the inequity does not justify particularly high payments
that are beyond the debtor's ability. If the debtor proposing small
payments is making the same relative effort as a debtor who proposes
large payments, their respective chances of failing to complete the plan
and receiving the narrower discharge should be about equal.
A debtor who has received bankruptcy relief and is not yet eligible
for a discharge under chapter 7M can receive a chapter 13 discharge. Such
a debtor might be required to propose payments to unsecured creditors
for two reasons. First, the legislative history discussing the unlimited
access to the chapter 13 discharge indicates that zero payment plans were
not contemplated. 9 Second, the restrictions on discharge under chapter
7 suggest an intent to prevent repeated discharges with little or no pay-
ment to unsecured creditors. It would be inconsistent to allow frequent
zero payment cases under chapter 13.
Congress' lack of favor for frequent bankruptcy discharges is evident
11 U.S.C. SS 1322(a)(3), 1322(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
See In re Carter, 9 Bankr. 140, 143 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981); Lee, Chapter 13 nee Chapter
XIII, 53 Am. BANKR. L.J. 303, 313 (1979).
See notes 32-33 & accompanying text supra.
If a debtor proposes payments only on secured claims and fails to complete the plan,
he should still be able to surrender the collateral and then modify the plan pursuant to
S 1329 and receive the full discharge. 11 U.S.C. S 1329 (Supp. IV 1980). But see Countryman,
Letter to the Editor, 85 CoM. L.J. 28 (1980). Professor Countr~man notes that the S 1328(a)
discharge includes only debts "provided for" by the plan, and that a zero payment plan
has not "provided for" unsecured debts. Id. While it is conceivable that a court would
use this language to deny a discharge, such a result seems unlikely if a plan is completed
as confirmed or as modified. Professor Countryman's observation nevertheless supports
the proposition that Congress intended for plans to propose some payment to all creditors.
See text accompanying notes 87-94 infra.
6 In re Iacovoni, 2 Bankr. 256, 262-63 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980).
See notes 35-36 & accompanying text supra.
" "Neither the interests of the debtor nor those of, his creditors are served by treating
conduct which would bar a discharge . .. in a liquidation case as precluding the debtor
from attempting to pay off his debts, in whole or in part, under.., a plan:' BANKRUPTCY
COMMISSION REPORT (pt. 2), supra note 39, at 208.
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from the very high payments that a debtor must make under chapter
13 in order to be eligible for a subsequent discharge in a chapter 7 case
filed within the six-year period .7 A court could be tempted to require
similarly high payments from debtors filing frequent chapter 13 petitions.
Congress declined to include such a standard in the statute, however,
and there is no evidence in the legislative history that a particularly high
percentage of payment on unsecured indebtedness was expected from deb-
tors who are not eligible for a discharge under chapter 7.2
A benefits-oriented approach to chapter 13 payments imposes require-
ments that are essentially based on the judge's subjective view of what
it takes to deserve the more complete relief of chapter 13 .7 The resulting
unpredictability and lack of uniformity are serious weaknesses in the ap-
plication of such an approach.74 An evaluation of chapter 13 payments
based on the relief obtained by the debtor also fails to provide a consis-
tent basis for rejecting zero payment plans. Some benefits, such as cram
down and keeping nonexempt property, do not compel larger payments
than would be made by the debtor under chapter 7.
THE REQUIREMENT OF PAYMENTS TO UNSECURED CREDITORS
The Rationale for the Requirement
Although many courts agree that all zero payment plans should be re-
See note 36 & accompanying text supra.
7' If the goal is to avoid repeated discharges with little or no payment to unsecured
creditors, it would be more consistent also to require high payments when a chapter 13
case is filed within six years after a nominal payment case. In such a situation a debtor
would not be eligible for chapter 7 relief, see notes 34-36 & accompanying text supra, so
a requirement of high payments would not conflict with the congressional intent to en-
courage debtors to choose chapter 13 over chapter 7. Imposing such a requirement without
regard to the debtor's ability to pay might be unwise, however, because the debtor who
is ineligible for a chapter 7 discharge is likely to make a very strong effort under chapter
13. See note 72 infra. If the debtor has no significant assets, creditors as a group will prob-
ably be better off receiving payments under a strong chapter 13 plan than competing
among themselves for limited remedies such as garnishment.
In practice, debtors who are ineligible for a discharge under chapter 7 may be subject
to substantial pressure to propose significant payments. Since the debtor cannot convert
the case to chapter 7, creditors and the court will have substantial leverage to require
him to pay as much as he can afford. This also is true to some extent when the debtor
takes advantage of the super discharge, since he will not want to convert to chapter 7
and remain obligated on the debt that would be discharged under chapter 13. See notes
111-12 & accompanying text infra. Although courts should not use good faith to impose
requirements that are beyond the debtor's ability to pay, a closer scrutiny of effort seems
inherent to this situation. The likelihood of a strong effort in these circumstances is a good
reason for retaining the broader and more frequent discharge available to chapter 13 deb-
tors. For a discussion of the degree of effort required of a chapter 13 debtor, see notes
99-138 & accompanying text infra.
3 See Note, Composition Plans, supra note 10, at 670.
74 Id.
71 See text accompanying notes 59-61 supra.
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jected, none has proposed a legitimate basis for doing so. Discussion of
the payment requirements have generally ignored section 1325(a)(1), which
states that a plan must "compl[y] with the provisions of this chapter .... ,6
Many courts have noted that payments to creditors are an essential pro-
vision of chapter 13. In re lacovoni," for example, lists several sections
referring to payments,' 8 but derives the requirement of payments to
unsecured creditors from the concept of good faith. An inquiry into good
faith is unnecessary however, if the debtor proposes no payments to any
creditors. Such a plan can be rejected under section 1325(a)(1) for failing
to comply with the statutory provisions that mention payments. 9
The provisions cited by Iacovoni include section 1326, titled "Payments,"
which refers to "the time of each payment to creditors"8 and provides
that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided ... the trustee shall make payments
to creditors under the plan."8' Iacovoni also observes that to be eligible
for chapter 13, a debtor must be "an individual'with regular income."
The Act defines an individual with regular income as someone "whose
income is sufficiently stable and regular to enable such individual to make
payments under a plan under Chapter 13 of this title."' Subsections 1328(a)
and (b) refer to completion or failure to complete "payments under the
plan," and section 1329 refers to modification of the plan "before the
completion of payments."' Section 1325(a)(6), which requires that the debtor
must "be able to make all payments under the plan,"' indicates that a
chapter 13 plan will be proposing payments.
The interpretation of section 1325(a)(1) is more difficult when a plan
includes priority or secured claims, because the statute does not state
whether payments must be proposed to all creditors. A plan that pro-
poses payments on priority or secured claims seems to satisfy the re-
quirement of payments, even if general unsecured creditors receive
nothingY However, the provisions referring to "payments" or "payments
to creditors" can and should be interpreted to require payments to all
creditors. Several considerations support this position.
If a plan includes only general unsecured claims, then section 1325(a)(1)
,' 11 U.S.C. S 1325(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
" 2 Bankr. 256 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980).
78 Id. at 262.
See In re Scher, [1980] 7 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 979, 989; Note, Zero Payment Plan,
supra note 10, at 333 n.30.
8 11 U.S.C. 5 1326(a) (Supp. IV 1980) (emphasis added).
81 Id. S 1326(b) (emphasis added).
Id. S 109(e).
Id. S 101(24) (emphasis added).
Id. S 1328(a-(b) (emphasis added).
8 Id. S 1329 (emphasis added).
Id. S 1325(a)(6) (emphasis added).
See In re Cloutier, 3 Bankr. 584 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980).
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requires payments on those claims. But unless payments are required
on all claims, the debtor can add a secured claim to the plan and be relieved
of proposing payments to unsecured creditors. A requirement of payments
to general unsecured creditors should not depend on the presence or
absence of other kinds of claims.
The legislative history of chapter 13 further supports a requirement
that debtors propose payments to all creditors. The House Report states:
"In some cases, the plan will call for full repayment. In others, it may
offer creditors a percentage of their claims in full settlement.' ' , A re-
quirement of payments to all creditors also follows from the reference
in the House and Senate reports to Congress' expectation that creditors
will receive more under chapter 13 than under a liquidation. 9 The
legislative history shows that section 1322(b)(4), which allows concurrent
payment of unsecured claims with other claims, was designed to prevent
debtors from completing payments to secured and priority creditors and
then defaulting before any payments had been made to unsecured credi-
tors.9 Such a default was regarded as an "abuse,"91 which reflects an in-
tent to require payments to unsecured creditors. Similarly, the restric-
tions on the availability of the chapter XIII discharge apparently were
removed in the new law because zero payment plans were not contem-
plated under chapter 13.92
The stated purpose of chapter 13-"to enable an individual . . . to
develop and perform under a plan for the repayment of his debts"93- also
suggests an intent to require payments to all creditors.
The Amount of Payment
If section 1325(a)(1) requires payments to all creditors, the issue arises
whether any payment, no matter how small, is acceptable. If any pay-
ment is sufficient, then the requirement becomes a meaningless formal-
ity. The House Report suggests that a plan proposing less than full pay-
ment should still constitute a "legitimate" offer;" accordingly, the
payments proposed to unsecured creditors should be sufficient to be con-
sidered legitimate.
The determination of what constitutes a legitimate payment should be
" H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 12, at 118. Later the report states that "[t]he plan may
provide for full or partial payment of creditors .... Id at 123. See also. Note, Legislative
Solution, supra note 10, at 786 (the word "creditors" in committee eports should be inter-
preted to mean all creditors).
"See note 12 & accompanying text supra.
" BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT (pt. 2), supra note 39, at 205.
"Id.
See notes 69-70 & accompanying text supra.
' H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 12, at 118.
4 See note 53 supra.
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based on the reality that extremely small payments are insulting to
creditors and unworthy of the time and expense needed to distribute
them. 5 Although a minimum payment requirement based on these con-
cerns will be arbitrary to some extent, a line should be drawn to establish
at what point a payment is legitimate. A minimum of about five percent
of unsecured indebtedness would be a reasonable payment requirement.
Although five percent is probably not' a substantial payment," a higher
requirement would force many debtors to choose liquidation, which is
unlikely to distribute anything to unsecured creditors. A higher standard
would also sacrifice too much of the flexibility intended for chapter 13.1
In' addition to furthering the congressional intent. that creditors receive
a legitimate return in chapter 13 cases, the five percent requirement would
offer practical advantages. The test is administratively convenient in allow-
ing rejection of zero or nominal payment plans without elaborate inquiry
by the court. The five percent test would also give debtors notice of a
concrete threshold that must be met, providing consistent and predict-
able results in the gray area of low payment plans. 8
THE GOOD FAITH EFFORT REQUIREMENT OF CHAPTER 13
The requirement that all debtors must propose a payment of at least
five percent of general unsecured indebtedness does not end the proposed
approach to evaluating chapter 13 plans. Many debtors may easily be able
to pay more than the five percent minimum, in which case additional
payments should be required. A requirement of a reasonable effort to
95 See In re Levine, 10 Bankr. 168, 171 n.5 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981); In re Webb, 3 Bankr.
61, 62 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980); In re lacovoni, 2 Bankr. 256, 268 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980).
See note 16 & accompanying text supra.
The legislative history contains isolated references to large payment plans: "[An overly
stringent and formalized chapter XIII (wage earner plans) has discouraged overextended
debtors from attempting to arrange a repayment plan under which all creditors are repaid
most, if not all, of their claims over an extended period." HR. REP. No. 595, supra note
12, at 117. The weight of the legislative history, however, discussing the expansion of eligibili-
ty for chapter 13 and the need to consider the debtor's individual circumstances, indicates
that large payments were not expected in all cases. See note 52 supra.
" The five percent minimum payment test seems incompatible with language found in
the most recent committee reports accompanying proposed amendments to chapter 13.
H.R. REP. No. 1195,96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 25 (1980), states that "the circumstances of a given
case may require that the court confirm a chapter 13 plan which proposes no dividend
whatever to holders of allowed unsecured claims .... S. REP. No. 150, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 19 (1981), says that "[n]o arbitrary repayment levels should be required by judges
.... These statements, made in discussions of the good faith effort requirement, see notes
99-111 & accompanying text infra, are appropriate as applied to that provision. The
statements should not affect the proposed interpretation of section 1325(a)(1), however,
which is not related to the debtor's ability to pay. Moreover, the five percent requirement
derived from section 1325(a)(1) is so low that virtually every debtor should be able to meet
it, although admittedly a few debtors will have to make greater sacrifices to do so.
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pay creditors is supported by comments made on the floor of Congress"
as well as an interpretation of "good faith" advocated by several courts"'
and commentators. 0 ' Although a reasonable effort requirement can be
derived from the statute in its present form,0 2 it is likely that Congress
"'Discussions of chapter 13 in the House and Senate debates indicate that debtors were
expected to make some effort: chapter 13 "preserves the debtors [sic] self-esteem by, per-
mitting him to pay his debts using his best efforts without incurring undue hardship:'
124 CONG. REC. S17404 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini). "We feel that if
the debtor makes an effort to repay his creditors, the creditors should not be able to say
that the plan does not propose to pay enough or that it does not do other things that
the creditors want:' 123 CONG. REC. 35,446 (1977) (remarks of Rep. Edwards). Furthermore,
the House report refers to a "legitimate offer of less than full payment," see note 53 supra,
and the Senate Report calls for a "reasonable plan for debt repayment based on that in-
dividual's exact circumstances," see note 52 supra.
10 See, e.g., In re Schongalla, 4 Bankr. 360 (Bankr. D. Md. 1980); In re Marlow, 3 Bankr.
305, 308 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1980).
101 See Note, Composition Plans, supra note 10; Note, De Minimis Plans, supra, note 10;
Note, Filing for Personal Bankruptcy: Adoption of a "Bona Fide Effort" Test Under Chapter
18, 14 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 321,335 n.61 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, "Bona Fide Effort"
Test].
"I The most widely accepted analysis concludes that good faith is lacking if "there has
been an abuse of the provisions, purpose, or spirit of Chapter XIII in the proposal or plan."
10 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 29.06[6] (14th ed. 1978). Stated another way, bad faith implies
an intention to misuse or undermine some aspect of the statutory scheme. A debtor who
does not make a reasonable effort to pay creditors is abusing the purpose of chapter 13-to
allow debtors to pay their creditors under a court's supervision and protection; H.R. REP.
No. 595, supra, note 11, at 118. The debtor who intends to pay much less than he can afford
also undermines the statutory goal of reducing losses to creditors. Id. The requirement
of a reasonable effort is therefore inherent to chapter 13's concept of good faith. This in-
terpretation was never reached under prior law because the element of creditor approval
made an inquiry into effort unnecessary. See Note, Legislative Solution, supra note 10, at
779 n.50.
Arguably the proposed amendments imposing a "bona fide effort" requirement, see note
103 infra, and accompanying committee reports, S. REP. No. 150, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 18
(1981), and H.R. REP. No. 1195,96th Cong., 2nd Sess.24-25 (1980), preclude a good faith effort
requirement under existing law. E.g., Cyr, supra note 3, at 276-83. Although the commit-
tee reports indicate that Congress did not expect good faith to be a factor in evaluating
chapter 13 payments, they nevertheless reinforce the notion that some degree of effort
was contemplated even under existing law. S. REP.NO. 150, supra, H.R. REP. No. 1195, supra.
The post hoc analysis of the reports, made in the context of great confusion among courts
regarding chapter 13 payment requirements, should not preclude a reasonable interpreta-
tion such as the one offered here. See Note, Legislative Solution, supra note 10, at 787-88
(ambiguity as to whether amendments are a clarification or alteration of existing law, and
uncertainty of their value as authority, render them inappropriate as a basis for judicial
interpretation).
Another argument against this note's interpretation of the existing good faith provision
is that it imposes an objective requirement that ignores the traditional focus of the good
faith inquiry-the debtor's intent and motives. See LoPucki, "Encouraging" Repayment Under
Chapter 18 of the Bankruptcy Code, 18 HARV. J. LEGIS. 347, 367 (1981). Although the good
faith effort inquiry focuses on objective factors, see notes 105-10 & accompanying text in.-
fra, it does not do violence to the traditional interpretation of good faith. A presumption
that the debtor is aware of his ability to pay creditors, and therefore knows when he is
paying much less than he can afford, is reasonable. A mandatory presumption or inference
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will remove any doubts on this issue by enacting a provision specifically
calling for a "bona fide effort" to pay creditors.1" Another proposed amend-
ment dealing with the amount of payments to be made under chapter
13 would create a standard based on the debtor's "disposable income."' '
A good example of an application of the good faith effort requirement
is found in In re Schongalla.1 15 The debtors, a married couple with no
children, claimed monthly expenses of $400 for food, $60 for recreation,
and $40 for books and magazines, yet proposed twelve monthly payments
of $25 on a class of unsecured claims totaling $20,000.o6 The court prop-
erly rejected the plan for lack of good faith, after focusing on thp
as to the debtor's intent may be somewhat unusual, but it is necessary to provide equal
treatment of debtors. Indeed, the debtor's intent must often be inferred in cases involving
lack of good faith. See In re Burns, 6 Bankr. 286 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980) (circumstances in-
dicated that debtors refused to pay unsecured creditors under chapter XIII plan, selec-
tively paid some creditors outside of plan, and then filed chapter 13 case to avoid payment
of creditors); In re Cassidy, 401 F. Supp. 757 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (possible finding on remand
of motive to delay for foreclosure with no intent to propose and complete chapter XIII
plan would be inferred from circumstances). The inferred intent of a debtor to pay less
than he can afford is incompatible with the statutory goals and purposes, and therefore
can legitimately be considered an abuse.
10 Both houses have passed versions of a technical amendments bill which would add
the bona fide effort requirement to S 1325(a)(4). S. 658, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. S 128(b), 126
CONG. REC. S15170, S15176 (daily ed. Dec. 1, f980); S. 658, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. S 127(b), 126
CONG. REC. H11735, H11740 (daily ed. Dec. 3,1980). The history of these provisions is discussed
more extensively in In re Scher, [1981] 7 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 979, 991-93; Note, Com-
position Plans, supra note 9, at 677 n.109. The Senate has also passed another bill that
contains the same change, the Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1981, S. 863, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. S 128(b), 127 CONG. REC. S7903-04 (daily ed. July 17, 1981); see S. REP. No. 150, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 18-19 (1981). The House has planned extensive hearings on consumer
bankruptcy during the second session of the 97th Congress, apparently with a view to
amending the Bankruptcy Reform Act. 127 CONG. REC. H9809 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1981).
104 Cyr, supra note 3, at 286-92. The amendment, proposed by the National Bankruptcy
Conference, would, among other things, add a subsection to S 1325 requiring that upon
objection by an unsecured creditor the court may not confirm a plan unless it proposes
to pay the debtor's projected disposable income for the three years beginning on the due
date of the first payment under the plan. Id. "Disposable income" is defined as "all earn-
ings and other income not reasonably necessary (a) for the support of the debtor and any
dependent of the debtor .... Id. at 289. This proposal articulates the relevant inquiry
more clearly than the good faith effort requirement, but it has drawbacks. First, the focus
on income necessary for "support" could be interpreted to require a uniform standard of
living for all chapter 13 debtors, which would be impractical. See text accompanying notes
114-15 infra. Second, unsecured creditors are not likely to react uniformly to chapter 13
plans, see notes 111-12 & accompanying text infra, and therefore the enforcement of the
proposed standard should not depend totally on them. Finally, the proposal appears to
require three-year plans in all cases in which an objection is made. Debtors should be allowed
the flexibility to propose a shorter plan that is a stronger effort than is required. See text
accompanying notes 108 & 127 infra. Under the Bankruptcy Conference amendment a pro-
posed monthly payment could be interpreted as a binding admission of disposable income,
even if it would be unduly burdensome to maintain the payment for three years.
05 4 Bankr. 360 (Bankr. D. Md. 1980).
" Id. at 361.
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"6reasonableness of the debtor's effort to deal fairly with his creditors.1 1 7
The level of effort required for good faith depends on several considera-
tions which must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. However, some
degree of uniformity of approach is desirable to foster equality of treat-
ment and predictability for debtors proposing plans. The most reliable
and objective indicators of effort are the duration of the plan and the
percentage of the debtor's future income allocated to payments. To main-
tain a relatively consistent standard for all debtors, these two factors
should be considered together. For example, if a debtor adopts a strict
budget and applies all available income toward payments, then the court
should not require that the plan extend for the three-year maximum.
Although a debtor can voluntarily impose a very strict budget for the
full three years, a requirement of that degree of effort would pose prob-
lems. A standard that is too strict would greatly discourage participation
in chapter 13. A requirement of very great effort would also require ex-
tensive probing into the debtor's finances, which would be administra-
tively burdensome. Moreover, the margin for error in evaluating the deb-
tor's ability to complete the plan would be very slim under such a finely
tuned approach, resulting in a substantial likelihood of unsuccessful
performance.
A good general guideline presented in In re Curtis 8 would require most-
debtors to commit to their repayment plan ten percent of their take-home
pay for three years. The ten percent figure is arbitrary and therefore
should be used only as a starting point for analysis. Nevertheless, the
guideline provides debtors with a rough idea of what is expected of them
and, more particularly, discourages the tendency to "pad" the budget so
that little or no excess income is available to pay creditors. 9 If a debtor
meets the ten-percent-for-three-years test, the court should still examine
the debtor's proposed budget and require substantiation or explanation
of any expenses that seem inordinately high. At the other end of the spec-
trum, debtors with expenses that are truly high in proportion to their
income should not be required to meet the guideline.110
Although creditors have a strong interest in the amount of payments
proposed under chapter 13, they may hesitate to raise objections if a plan
proposes some payments but is not a good faith effort. The creditors run
the risk that instead of responding to an objection with greater payments,
the debtor who is challenged will exercise his right to convert to chapter
7111 and possibly pay nothing. Because of the possible lack of incentive
' Id. at 363.
108 2 Bankr. 43 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1979).
' See LoPucki, supra note 102, at 371-72.
110 Professor LoPucki observes that the guideline essentially creates a rebuttable presump-
tion of ability to pay. Id. at 369.
11 U.S.C. S 1307(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
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for creditors to raise the issue, the bankruptcy judge must take an active
role in evaluating the debtor's effort. While an emphasis on effort will
be more time-consuming than a requirement of substantial payments, it
will allow more debtors to participate in chapter 13 and thereby will
reduce losses to creditors more effectively.112 The goal of reducing losses
to creditors is laudable because the savings will be passed on to consumers
in the form of cheaper credit.
APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED APPROACH
If a debtor has satisfied the "best interests of creditors" test, the next
step proposed for evaluating chapter 13 payments to unsecured creditors
is the five percent test. The five percent payment requirement, derived
from section 1325(a)(1), will dispose of all zero payment plans efficiently."'
The final, most time-consuming step recommended for evaluating the
amount of payments proposed by a plan is the good faith effort test, which
in many cases will require payments that exceed five percent of unsecured
indebtedness. If the debtor is proposing some payments to unsecured
creditors and is making a reasonable effort, there is no justification for
" Congress predicted that "[tlhe benefit to creditors [of Chapter 13] is self-evident: their
losses will be significantly less than if their debtors opt for straight bankruptcy." H.R.
REP. No. 595, supra note 12, at 118. Losses to creditors will be reduced more effectively by
large numbers of debtors paying according to their ability than by a much smaller number
making "substantial" payments. That Congress adopted this position is evident from the
expansion of chapter 13 eligibility and the desire to encourage participation in chapter 13.
Congress also expected that chapter 13 would preserve a debtor's credit standing and
eliminate the stigma associated with straight bankruptcy. I&L One scholar correctly observes
that contrary to Congress' expectations the good faith effort standard will not eliminate
the stigma of bankruptcy because the standard would not prohibit low payment plans and
would not distinguish between debtors who have been unscrupulous or irresponsible before
filing and those who have been merely unfortunate. LoPucki, supra note 102, at 372-83.
The more serious problem is that even under a higher payment standard chapter 13 deb-
tors are likely to experience some stigma, see id. at 378 n.120, because from a creditor's
perspective any effort that is less than full payment with interest should affect the deb-
tor's credit worthiness. The unlimited access to the chapter 13 discharge in particular may
make creditors fearful that a debtor who has taken advantage of chapter 13 will do so again.
Congress should deal with this problem realistically by requiring credit reporting agen-
cies to include specific information about chapter 13 cases, such as the percentage of in-
debtedness that the debtor proposed to pay and the debtor's subsequent success or failure
in performing under the plan. This information can be supplied easily by bankruptcy courts.
Id. If creditors are fully informed, standards for evaluating credit worthiness of chapter
13 debtors will inevitably emerge and will provide notice to debtors of the effect of various
levels of performance.
For debtors who are unable to achieve repayment levels that will help their credit rating,
other incentives are needed to encourage participation in chapter 13. The proposal to pro-
vide chapter 7 debtors the benefits of chapter 13 without a good faith effort requirement,
LoPucki, supra, at 387, would eliminate the incentives for many debtors to choose chapter
13 and therefore should not be adopted.
113 See notes 76-98 & accompanying text supra.
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further payment requirements based on chapter 13 benefits. Under the
proposed approach the benefits of chapter 13 should have no bearing on
the confirmation of a plan.
By giving substantial weight to the percentage of income committed
to repaying creditors, the proposed evaluation of effort does not attempt
to impose the same standard of living on all chapter 13 debtors."' If all
debtors are forced to live within the same budget, the sacrifice required
of higher income debtors would be unacceptable to them. In particular,
debtors should not have to move to a cheaper house or apartment if their
housing expense is reasonable in relation to their income. It would be
similarly unworkable to limit all debtors to the same allowance for
automobile payments, although some debtors clearly will have to give
up cars that are burdensome or unnecessary."'
For many expense items, however, such as food, clothing, and recrea-
tion, debtors are not locked into fixed payments; closer scrutiny of these
items is appropriate and is likely to result in greater sacrifices for deb-
tors with higher incomes. For example, no matter how great a debtor's
income is, a plan that provides for a high food expense to accommodate
frequent dining out should not be confirmed.
The Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States states that chapter 13 debtors should not be required to apply
nonexempt assets toward payment of debts "except insofar as such ap-
plication may be deemed necessary ... to meet the statutory standards
of the 'best interests of creditors' and 'good faith.' "118 If the debtor's in-
come alone is insufficient to make payments required by the "best in-
terests" test or the proposed five percent test, then the debtor will have
to surrender enough nonexempt assets to meet the tests. But a further
requirement of liquidation based on good faith should be imposed spar-
ingly; otherwise, debtors are likely to choose chapter 7, under which their
assets will be liquidated anyway without sacrificing future income. Only
if the debtor's property is extensive should a good faith effort require
liquidation of nonexempt assets.'
Generally, cram down of secured creditors should be liberally allowed,
"' See LoPucki, supra note 102, at 368-69.
" See note 118 & accompanying text infra.
118 BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT (pt. 1), supra note 39, at 164.
1,, One commentator suggests that debtors with substantial non-exempt property will
file under chapter 11 to keep the property, LoPucki, supra note 102, at 363-64, yet
acknowledges that courts will be able to reject such chapter 11 plans. I& at 364-65.
Professor LoPucki also cites inequities that would result if chapter 13 debtors in states
with liberal exemption laws were allowed to keep large amounts of exempt property. Id.
at 367-68. A good faith effort standard should require such debtors to apply some exempt
property toward payment of creditors, which unfortunately would cause those debtors to
choose chapter 7. Id. at 386. This problem is caused by inequalities in state exemption
laws, however, not by any shortcomings of chapter 13.
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but problems may arise in some cases. The cram down option may re-
quire so much future income that the debtor is unable to satisfy the five
percent requirdment for payments on unsecured indebtedness. In such
cases the debtor will have to surrender the collateral to the secured
creditor. The good faith effort standard may also restrict the use of cram
down. If the payments necessary to retain the collateral are too burden-
some, or the property is an unnecessary luxury, cram down would be
unfair to unsecured creditors who would be paid more if the property
were surrendered. 8
A few cases help illustrate the application of the proposed approach
to payments on unsecured claims. A good example of a plan that was
properly rejected, but for the wrong reason, can be found in In re
Marsch.9 The court in Marsch found that the plan, which proposed a
twenty-five percent payment of unsecured claims, was deficient because
two-thirds of the unsecured indebtedness was made up of student loans
that would be nondischargeable under chapter 7.120 The debtor received
take home pay of $980 a month, but proposed to pay only $45 a month
into the plan.12' The court should not have considered the nature of the
debts to be discharged; instead, the plan should have been rejected for
lack of a good faith effort.
Two similar cases in which the length of the plan was at issue illustrate
the lack of uniformity regarding good faith. In In re Curtis2" the debtors
were a married couple who had one child and were expecting another.
Their net income was $783 a month and they proposed payments of $75
a month for eighteen months.' The debtors in In re Hall" had two
children and a net monthly income of $676. They proposed to pay $75
a month for fifteen months." Both couples met the threshold five per-
cent test advocated by this note.'26 Although they did not propose to pay
ten percent of their income for the full three years, both couples were
making a very strong effort in view of their limited incomes and high
expenses. Under these circumstances the good faith effort test.was
118 See In re Granger, 7 Bankr. 14 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980); In re Patterson, 4 Bankr. 239
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1980); S. REP. No. 150, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1981) ("There should be
no such expenses as the purchase of new cars or for that matter continuing to make payments
on a nearly new car at the expense of unsecured creditors under the plan."); Note, De
Minimis Plans, supra note 10, at 616-17; Note, "Bona Fide Effort" Test, supra note 101,
at 339-40.
11 Bankr. 514 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1981).
12 Id. at 515.
121 Id.
12 2 Bankr. 43 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1979).
1 Id. at 44.
124 4 Bankr. 341 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980).
1 Id. at 341.
1 The plan in Hall would have yielded a 6% dividend to unsecured creditors, id. at
342, and the Curtis plan proposed to pay 10% of unsecured indebtedness, 2 Bankr. at 43.
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satisfied, although the plan was confirmed in Curtis and rejected for lack
of good faith in Hall.
The couples in Curtis and Hall elected to make an extremely strong
effort for a period shorter than the three-year maximum. To require such
an effort for three years would be unduly harsh. The debtors could have
satisfied the good faith effort test by proposing significantly lower
payments for the full thirty-six months, but if the deferred payments were
discounted to present value, the net result for creditors would be similar.'"
Two cases in which low payment plans were confirmed illustrate the
application of the good faith effort requirement and the five percent test.
Because of her criminal record, the debtor in In re Keckler2 8 could only
find part-time work for her father earning $215 a month. Her plan pro-
posed payments of $15 a month for three years, yielding a five percent
dividend to unsecured creditors.11 The case revealed no reason why the
debtor could not pay at least ten percent of her net income, particularly
since she was living with her parents and had low expenses. The plan
should have been rejected for lack of a good faith effort.
In In re Dills'3 ° the debtor's net income was $97 a week, and he propos-
ed to pay creditors $10 a week for one year. The payments constituted
a reasonable effort in view of the debtor's contributions to family expenses.
The dividend to unsecured creditors under the plan, however, was only
one percent. ' Accordingly, the debtor should have been required to con-
tinue the payments for an additional seven or eight months to meet the
five percent test.
The extent to which a good faith effort requires a debtor to change
his style of living is dealt with in In re Manning. 3 2 The debtors in Mann-
ing were a married couple with three children who apparently were in
college. The children did not work. Although their net monthly income
was about $2,600, the debtors proposed to pay $80 a month for more than
four years. ' No payments to unsecured creditors were proposed. The
debtors claimed a monthly food expense of $754, explaining that the en-
tire family required a special diet."' A transportation expense of more
than $300 was claimed, even though secured creditors on two automobiles
were provided for separately.'s It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that
12 For example, if the debtors in Hall paid $40 a month for three years, the present
value of the payments would be comparable to that of the payments actually proposed,
assuming an 18% interest rate.
125 3 Bankr. 155 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980).
225 Id. at 156.
10 [1980] 6 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 800.
3 Id- at 801.
5 Bankr. 387 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1980).
133 Id.
23 Id. at 388.
" Id. at 387-88.
1982]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
the claimed expenses were either exaggerated or unnecessary; conse-
quently, the debtors' failure to meet the preliminary ten-percent-for-three-
years test is not justified. The five percent test provides an even clearer
basis for rejecting the plan.
The court in Manning found that to satisfy the good faith requirement
the debtors should rent half of their house, which was a duplex, and apply
the rental income to their plan.13 The court would have been correct in
suggesting this measure as a means to meet the five percent require-
ment. But only rarely should good faith require debtors to change their
lifestyle so radically.1 7 The debtors' house in Manning was not an
unreasonable burden in view of their income," 8 nor was it an unnec-
essary luxury. The court should, have focused its analysis on the unusual
expenses claimed by the debtors. The result was correct, however, because
the court exposed the lack of merit in the debtors' claim that they were
a hardship case.
CONCLUSION
Many courts interpreting the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 have cor-
rectly required that chapter 13 plans propose payments to unsecured
creditors, but the decisions are based largely on an unsound view of the
relationship between good faith and the special benefits of chapter 13.
Evaluating plans on the basis of the debtor's use of chapter 13 benefits
has sometimes resulted in unreasonable standards that undermine the
congressional intent to attract more debtors to chapter 13 and to reduce
losses to creditors." 9
A legitimate statutory justification is available for rejecting zero pay-
ment plans under chapter 13. Section 1325(a)(1) of chapter 13 should be
interpreted to require that debtors propose to pay at least five percent
of their unsecured indebtedness. To satisfy the requirement of good faith
found in section 1325(a)(3), a chapter 13 plan should represent a reasonable
effort by the debtor to pay unsecured creditors. Bankruptcy courts should
evaluate effort initially in terms of the percentage of the debtor's income
proposed as payments, using the Curtis guideline of ten percent for three
years. Higher payments should be required, however, if a plan that meets
the guideline includes expenses that are not reasonable, and lower
payments should be allowed if the court determines that the debtor's liv-
ing expenses are unusually high in proportion to his income.
MARK H. EDWARDS
1 Id. at 388.
"* See text accompanying notes 114-15 supra.
"' The debtors' house expense of $681 a month took about 26% of their income. 5 Bankr.
at 387-88.
See note 50 supra.
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